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Abstract. This paper investigates whether practical interests affect knowledge 
attributions in cases of testimony. It is argued that stakes impact testimonial 
knowledge attributions by increasing or decreasing the requirements for hearers 
to trust speakers and thereby gain the epistemic right to acquire knowledge via 
testimony. Standard, i.e. invariantist, reductionism and non-reductionism fail to 
provide a plausible account of testimony that is stakes sensitive, while non-
invariantist versions of both traditional accounts can remedy this deficiency. 
Support for this conceptual analysis of stakes is found through a review of the 
experimental philosophy literature on stakes effects on knowledge attribution. 
Finally, a diagnosis is offered for what is needed to provide a more robust 
defense of the paper’s primary claims in terms of future experimental study. 
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In this paper, we demonstrate that stakes effects on testimony suggest that both invariantist 
forms of reductionism and non-reductionism are flawed accounts of testimonial knowledge. 
This negative project is balanced with a proposal to salvage reductionism and non-
reductionism: we offer stakes-sensitive versions of these accounts and establish that these 
versions resolve our objections (Section 1). Empirical evidence supporting our account is 
found in the experimental philosophy literature, specifically the literature on stakes effects for 
knowledge. We consider significant cases featuring testimony, particularly BRIDGE, PINE 
NUTS, and IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT, and argue that they support the account laid out in 
Section 1 by revealing the inability of standard reductionism and non-reductionism to 
account for empirical work on stakes (Section 2). This paper’s subject, the conceptual and 
empirical study of stakes effects on testimony, has received limited discussion in the 
traditional and experimental philosophical literature.1 This is unfortunate as a collaborative 
interaction between traditional and experimental philosophy grants the best understanding of 
testimony and stakes effects. Section 3, the paper’s conclusion, suggests ways in which 
experimental philosophers can begin to directly test stakes effects for testimony. 
 
Section 1 - Testimony, Stakes, and Conceptual Mistakes: Challenging Standard Accounts of 
Testimony  
 
1.1 The Significance of Stakes for Testimony   
Until the late 1980s, philosophers investigating the conditions for knowledge attribution 
presumed that such conditions are determined by truth-relevant factors, those elements 
which are able to increase or lower the likelihood of the subject’s belief that p is true – e.g. 
justification, reliability, and evidence. In the last few decades, several researchers started to 
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inquire whether features of the conversational context and truth-irrelevant factors, such as 
the subject’s error possibilities and other practical interests, might affect knowledge 
attributions as well. Contextualists, including Keith DeRose, Stewart Cohen, and David 
Lewis, argued for a controversial thesis: in certain conversational contexts, particularly in 
those where error possibilities have been raised, it may no longer be true that an individual 
knows, even if that individual knew in contexts when those error possibilities had not been 
raised.2 Respondents to DeRose included proponents of interest-relative invariantism or 
subject-sensitive invariantism, such as Jeremy Fantl, John Hawthorne, Matthew McGrath, 
and Jason Stanley, who contended that practical interests matter as an epistemic fact about 
a situation.3 Whether we should attribute knowledge in a given situation is not based on the 
conversational context, as suggested by contextualists; rather, it depends upon facts about 
what is at stake for the subject and the attributor, i.e. their practical interests. Contrastivists 
argued that contextualism was right about the context-sensitivity of knowledge, but that 
what is relevant for each context is the appropriate contrast class of knowledge claims being 
considered in each case.4 
This paper is indebted to the debate concerning stakes effects on knowledge and the 
experimental literature that succeeded it. Where this paper breaks from past analyses comes 
through focusing on a very specific issue: the impact of stakes on testimony. While our 
analysis may have import for the larger question of whether stakes impact knowledge 
attributions, we only address the local question of whether stakes affect attributions of 
testimonial knowledge. We will do so by comparing invariantist and non-invariantist 
theories in this paper. By calling a position ‘non- invariantist’, we simply mean that the 
position is a form of contextualism or contrastivism, and we allow the reader to consider 
whether specific forms of interest-relative invariantist or subject-sensitive invariantist are 
impacted by our arguments. 
The following set of cases offers an example to expand analysis of stakes effects so as 
to include cases of testimonial knowledge. Consider whether James, the protagonist in the 
following vignettes, has knowledge. 
 
FINE ART RESTORER LOW (FAR LOW) 
James is an expert fine art restorer who works for the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York. He plans to spend his holidays in Rome for the first time in his life, and once arriving 
in St. Peter’s Square, James decides he wants to visit the Vatican Museums, one of the 
greatest Italian art collections. After he gets off the train in St. Peter Station, James realizes 
that taxi-drivers are going on strike; hence the roads are closed to traffic and he must walk 
to the museum. Thus, James asks for directions from Letizia, the first passerby who knows 
how to speak English. The lady replies: “The Vatican Museums are less than one mile away 
from here. You can just take Via di Porta Angelica, then make a left on Via Leone IV. Then, 
after a few steps, you’ll see the long line of visitors of the Vatican Museums on your left.” (p) 
 
 
FINE ART RESTORER HIGH (FAR HIGH) 
James is an expert fine art restorer who works for the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York. He is in Rome for the first time in his life, and needs to get to the Vatican Museums 
immediately, since he is late for a job interview with the director who is selecting her 
successor for the next three years. Getting this position would definitely be a huge step 
forward in James’ career. Once James arrives in St. Peter’s Square, he realizes that taxi-
drivers are going on strike; hence the roads are closed to traffic and he must walk to the 
museum. Thus, James asks for directions from Letizia, the first passerby who knows how to 
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speak English. The lady replies: “Vatican Museums are less than one mile away from here. 
You can just take Via di Porta Angelica, then make a left on Via Leone IV. Then, after a 
few steps, you’ll see the long line of visitors of the Vatican Museums on your left.” (p) 
 
 
In FAR HIGH and FAR LOW, Letizia is a reliable source of testimonial knowledge: (i) 
Letizia’s belief concerning the directions to the Vatican Museums is true; (ii) her evidence is 
very high, high enough to satisfy requirements for knowledge in high stakes; (iii) she is a 
sincere, reliable testifier. To motivate the impact of stakes, FAR LOW has .85 probability that 
p represents James’ threshold for knowledge, whereas in FAR HIGH his threshold is .95, and 
in both cases Letizia has .96 evidence in support of her belief that p, and hence her evidence 
exceeds James’ threshold for knowledge (.85). To further motivate the significance of stakes, 
she is not sensitive to James’ practical interests nor does he let her know anything for the 
reason and urgency of his question. FAR LOW is a low-stakes situation, in which James has 
an ordinary and not urgent practical interest, whereas in FAR HIGH he is in high-stakes due 
to his tight schedule and need to make a good impression with the director. What seems 
problematic is that James’ different practical interests make a knowledge predication very 
easy in FAR LOW yet difficult in FAR HIGH. FAR HIGH establishes a high bar for James’s 
supposed knowledge—failure to find the museum means he could lose his chance to get the 
job. This failure undermines his possible knowledge and does not appear in the very 
mundane FAR LOW, where there is a minor harm if James fails to have knowledge. The key 
issue that emerges from these cases is whether stakes can affect knowledge attributions so 
that James in FAR HIGH lacks the very knowledge we may ascribe to him in FAR LOW. As 
we argue in the next section, what is central to testimonial knowledge attributions is the 
possibility for James to trust Letizia: specifically, whether James as the hearer is 
epistemically entitled to accept Letizia’s testimony as the speaker and acquire knowledge 
from her.5  
   
1.2 How Stakes Undermines Reductionism and Non-Reductionism  
Stakes effects undermine two of the standard accounts of testimony, reductionism and non-
reductionism. To give a minimal definition of these views, reductionism requires that the 
hearer (hereafter, H) possess non-testimonial evidence to accept the speaker’s (hereafter, S) 
testimony. In other words, “reductionist testimonial knowledge is always the result of an 
inductive inference from […] basic kinds of evidence that we get through perception, memory, 
etc” [Riggs (2009), p. 211]. Conversely, non-reductionism merely demands that H lack 
defeaters that count against S’s trustworthiness or the reliability of S’s testimony, in order 
for H to be in the position to accept the testimony. 
The central issue when predicating testimonial knowledge is whether knowledge has 
been transmitted from the speaker to the hearer. Reductionist and non-reductionist accounts 
pose different requirements for the transmission of knowledge. According to non-
reductionists, the absence of defeaters is sufficient for granting transmission of knowledge 
through testimony from S to H because H has an epistemic right to trust S, to believe what S 
says on the ground that S asserted so. In contrast, reductionists deny that H possesses such 
epistemic right, for it is just H’s non-testimonial evidence that allows H to believe S’s 
testimony.  
Introducing the notion of an epistemic right to trust requires a couple of remarks. 
Firstly, the epistemic right is what enables a direct procedure for granting that S’s belief and 
its epistemic proprieties can be passed from S to H without any loss in terms of evidence and 
credence. If H has the epistemic right to trust S—or if H is epistemically entitled in trusting 
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–a person who knows some proposition p, then H acquires testimonial knowledge via direct 
transmission of belief and its epistemic proprieties from S. Secondly, notice that the epistemic 
right must be only “presumptive,” hence, it must be defeasible in appropriate circumstances. 
Any right, including an epistemic right, allows one to do something if we find ourselves in 
the conditions to exert it. For instance, Joseph has the right, as Ph.D. student at the 
University of Genoa, to receive a bursary on a monthly basis, unless he already does some 
other job in which he earns EUR500. The mere fact that there are conditions in which 
Joseph loses his right of receiving the bursary does not entail that he does not possess that 
right.   
In determining whether or not James is epistemically entitled to accept Letizia’s 
testimony, of chief importance are his practical interests. In low stakes, epistemic entitlement 
is easy to achieve—lacking evidence that the speaker is untrustworthy or that her testimony 
is unreliable suffices to put one in the position to trust the interlocutor. Epistemic 
entitlement is far more difficult to achieve in high stakes, where the risk of following wrong 
directions would almost certainly lead James to miss the job interview. Despite the impact of 
stakes on knowledge attributions, the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism has 
arisen within an invariantist framework; thus, both views commonly assume that the 
standards for the attribution of knowledge to H based on S’s testimony are not affected by 
variations in non-epistemic factors, such as H’s practical interests.6 A few philosophers have 
recently discussed stakes and testimony, beginning with Freedman 2015a. While the resulting 
dialectic focused on Freedman’s connection between epistemic risk and emotional investment 
for testimonial stakes effects [Freedman 2015b, Kukla 2015, Fantl 2015], Freedman, Kukla, 
and Fantl have missed how stakes impact the central role of epistemic entitlement required 
for knowledge attribution, in addition to ignoring the significance of experimental work 
(apart from Kukla’s brief discussion [Kukla (2015), pg. 47-48]). But, as argue in the 
remainder of section 1, the viability of reductionism and non-reductionism to account for 
testimonial stakes effects relies upon whether the hearer, in different stakes situations, retains 
the epistemic right to believe the speaker’s words, thereby making the transmission of 
knowledge possible.  
 
1.3 Non-reductionism and Practical Defeaters 
Invariantist non-reductionists are in the position to maintain that in FAR LOW James is 
justified in accepting Letizia’s testimony, unless he has defeaters against her trustworthiness 
and the reliability of her testimony. In other words, James is epistemically entitled to trust 
her unless she gives cues of psychological or epistemic instability (e.g. she looks under effect 
of drugs), or she says something plainly wrong or unlikely (e.g. that Vatican Museums are in 
Naples). Consider now FAR HIGH, in which James has a practical urgent need to quickly get 
to the Vatican Museums. Here the epistemic features of the scenario do not change: Letizia 
provided the very same directions, indeed she is as reliable as she was in the previous case 
and James lacks any defeaters to doubt her testimony. Consequently, non-reductionists are 
committed to attribute knowledge to James, as they lack sensitivity to differences in non-
epistemic factors.  
Nevertheless, James lacks any epistemic right to trust Letizia due to his being in high-
stakes: although she stopped walking and gave a cooperative and apt reply to his question, 
which are epistemic reasons to accept her testimony, James has to be at the job interview 
with the Director of the Vatican Museums soon and he cannot afford to take the wrong 
direction. In such circumstances, the extraordinary practical interests prevent James from 
acquiring testimonial knowledge via mere transmission. This is not to say that all things 
considered he cannot achieve knowledge; yet he lacks the epistemic right to trust her, for he 
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cannot rely on the fact that Letizia provided reliable testimony unless he acquires further 
evidence in support of such presumption and, hence, knowledge cannot be directly 
transmitted, due to H’s extraordinary practical interests.  
In order to account for James’s lack of epistemic entitlement to believe Letizia in FAR 
HIGH, non-reductionists should endorse a non-invariantist account of testimonial knowledge. 
Assuming a non-invariantist non-reductionist framework allows one to claim that James’s 
specific need to get to the interview constitutes a practical defeater, i.e.  a particular non-
epistemic condition that defeats the justified status of James’s belief, in that it prevents him 
from being entitled to believe Letizia’s testimony without looking for non-testimonial 
evidence. Happily, this view comes at no price for non-reductionists, because this non-
invariantist inclusion neither undermines core non-reductionist principles, nor does it 
preclude epistemic defeaters from preventing the transmission of testimonial knowledge. In 
sum, practical defeaters simply constitute a further category of conditions under which it 
would be epistemically rational for non-invariantist non-reductionists to deny the hearer the 
epistemic right to trust the speaker that he possesses in ordinary circumstances.   
 
1.4 Reductionism and non-testimonial evidence 
As pointed out in 1.2, according to reductionists, the absence of defeaters does not guarantee 
that the hearer is justified in believing what the speaker says. Reductionists maintain that 
what makes one entitled to believe another’s words is the positive non-testimonial evidence 
that the hearer is able to provide to support the speaker’s  utterances. However, at first 
glance, it seems as in FAR LOW – absent any defeaters for Letizia’s testimony – James has 
the epistemic right to trust her even in absence of positive evidence of her trustworthiness, 
simply by virtue of his ordinary practical interests. Even though he wants to reach the 
Vatican Museums, he needs not rule out every possibility of epistemic and practical failure. 
His being in low stakes allows him to expect that Letizia will give a reliable testimony 
without demanding him to look for further evidence. 
Therefore, some might think that reductionists are committed to deny James 
testimonial knowledge in FAR LOW, as he lacks non-testimonial evidence to justify Letizia’s 
directions. There are three kinds of additional evidence which the reductionist might appeal 
to for evaluating whether James is in the position to gain knowledge via S’s testimony: (i) 
evidence that directly confirms (or disconfirms) S’s testimony, e.g. James can consult a map 
of Rome; (ii) S’s past track record, e.g. James had a long-standing personal knowledge of 
Letizia; finally, (iii) evidence concerning S’s trustworthiness and the reliability of the 
testimony [Gelfert (2014), p. 103]. To construct a stakes case for testimony, we must suppose 
that James lacks (i) and (ii). Therefore, if reductionists want to resist this objection, they 
should appeal to (iii). As a matter of fact, James lacks evidence pertaining to Letizia’s 
trustworthiness (e.g. she does not wear a name tag or t-shirt from a tourist guide company) 
and the credibility of what she testifies (e.g. he does not know that her testimony is 
consistent with the best maps of Rome).7  The reductionist would note that James’ selection 
of a speaker, a sober adult Roman, when combined with his ability to evaluate Letizia as a 
competent speaker of English language, provides him with enough non-testimonial evidence 
for satisfying the reductionist condition in FAR LOW. Additionally, the reductionist would 
point out that James is justified in accepting Letizia’s testimony only if he makes sure that 
he is talking to a reliable interlocutor through an inductive inference – viz. an inference from 
perceptual information he receives about the reliability of Letizia’s directions. According to 
reductionists, James might have inferred that Letizia’s directions are reliable from reflecting 
that locals are generally trustworthy regarding directions and that Letizia appears to be a 
local. Hence, reductionists are in the position to explain why James is justified in believing 
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Letizia’s testimony in low stakes.8 
Granted that both reductionism and non-reductionism can explain how James acquires 
testimonial knowledge in FAR LOW, we need to determine whether reductionism fares better 
in high-stakes situations. One might think that, given the stricter requirements on 
testimonial knowledge posed by reductionists, it should be easier for them to accommodate 
cases like FAR HIGH, by requiring that James gains robust non-testimonial evidence to trust 
Letizia’s directions. However, notice that this should not be the case: according to the 
invariantist form of reductionism we have so far considered, FAR LOW and FAR HIGH feature 
two epistemically identical scenarios in which the only variable element is James’s practical 
interests. Once we admit that non-epistemic factors cannot affect the epistemic evaluation of 
the two situations, we must conclude that according to reductionists the inductive inference 
that justifies James in low stakes should provide him with sufficient evidence to acquire 
knowledge from Letizia even in high stakes. But this is problematic: it seems clear that 
James’s relying on the mere inference that Letizia’s directions should be accurate given that 
she appears to be a local is epistemically irresponsible when he has to make sure he gets to 
the museums in time for the job interview. In this scenario, the reductionist would require 
that James double-checks her directions, that he looks for street signs or that he buys a map 
of Rome, and we would not be willing to attribute knowledge to him unless he provides 
further evidence in support of the inductive inference he may have made.  In other words, 
invariantist reductionists cannot appeal to the difference in James’s practical interests in 
order to raise the threshold of non-testimonial evidence that he needs to possess if he wants 
to acquire testimonial knowledge.  
In contrast, non-invariantist reductionism can certainly account for FAR HIGH. The 
only concession is that a non-epistemic factor, such as James’s practical need to get to the 
important appointment on time, can raise his threshold for knowledge to the point that his 
inductive inference about Letizia’s trustworthiness provides him with insufficient evidence to 
grant him testimonial knowledge. Further non-testimonial evidence of the kind we mentioned 
in the last paragraph, in conjunction with the evidence provided by the inference, could 
suffice to justify his testimonial belief in high stakes. 
In summary, both invariantist non-reductionism and reductionism are unable to 
accommodate the difference between low-stakes and high-stakes situations. Non-reductionism 
is unreasonably concessive, in that it grants H the epistemic right to trust S in high-stake 
scenarios simply by virtue of H’s lacking epistemic defeaters for the testimony. Reductionism 
is potentially better placed to provide the necessary requirements that grant transmission of 
testimonial knowledge in high-stakes, because it has something positive to say about the 
evidence one needs to possess. Unfortunately, reductionists cannot benefit from this 
advantage due to their invariantist assumptions, in that they commit themselves to the 
wrong claim that the same non-testimonial evidence that justifies H in low-stakes fails to 
allow him to acquire testimonial knowledge in high-stakes too. Non-invariantist versions of 
these theories can explain how practical interests affect attributions of testimonial 
knowledge. Non-invariantist non-reductionism pinpoints those high-stake situations in which 
H loses the epistemic right to trust S due to the presence of practical defeaters. Non-
invariantist reductionism accounts for the difference between FAR LOW and FAR HIGH by 
conceding that H’s practical interests make his inductive inference about S’s trustworthiness 
insufficient to grant him testimonial knowledge. Further non-testimonial evidence, in 
conjunction with the evidence provided by the inference, could suffice to justify H’s 
testimonial belief in high stakes. If so, non-invariantist reductionism could claim an 
advantage over non-invariantist non-reductionism, as the latter only tells us a negative story 
about how hearers lose the epistemic right to trust the speaker in high stake situations, 
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whereas the former has a positive explanation for how hearers acquire knowledge in high 
stake situations. This would be an extremely interesting point in favour of non-invariantist 
reductionism as a theory of testimonial knowledge, and an issue we intend to explore in 
future works. 
 
Section 2-The Significance of Experimental Philosophy for Testimony and Stakes  
 
2.1 Stakes, Experimental Philosophy, and Testimony  
In this section we will show how the experimental philosophy literature supports the 
argument made in Section 1 by demonstrating the inability of invariantist forms of 
reductionism and non-reductionism to account for stakes effects. Our strategy mirrors Jessica 
Brown’s defense of the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning (2013): the stakes literature 
will be analyzed to consider evidence for the paper’s earlier argument, which is possible 
through highlighting support from various studies, explaining why vignettes test issues 
beyond what the authors of the respective vignettes intended, and developing an original 
account for why the literature supports a non-invariantist approach to testimony. Adequate 
evidence for our conceptual argument against invariantist accounts of testimonial knowledge 
will be provided insofar as a stakes effect for the attribution of such knowledge is found in 
the experimental philosophy literature. If it is found that there is a significant difference in 
folk testimonial knowledge attributions between low and high stakes, our first target would 
be achieved. Indeed, such findings would challenge both invariantist theories of testimonial 
knowledge, which – as already argued – would predict a stable attribution of knowledge to H 
across cases featuring mere variations in H’s practical interests. Additional evidence against 
forms of invariantism can be drawn from analyzing the specific set-up of each vignette in 
terms of the testimonial and/or non-testimonial evidence at H’s disposal. The final step in 
addressing the empirical literature consists in showing that non-invariantist versions of 
reductionism and non-reductionism can easily explain the experimental findings. 
 
2.2 What the Experimental Literature Reveals About Testimony and Stakes  
Intriguingly, a number of studies on stakes effects in experimental philosophy rely on 
testimony as a central feature in various cases, particularly in the vignettes BRIDGE, PINE 
NUTS, and IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT9. In BRIDGE, the case presented in Feltz and 
Zarpentine (2010), John is a truck driver who, upon reaching a bridge over a small or large 
expanse, receives radio clearance to drive over the bridge. The radioperson reports that the 
rest of his fifteen-truck caravan has safely crossed over, and John reasons that he should be 
safe driving over in his truck.  
PINE NUTS is a complex vignette with multiple instances of testimony.10 Hannah and 
her sister are eating at a Mongolian restaurant. Stakes are related to Hannah either being 
slightly or severely allergic to Mongolian Pine Nuts. Hannah is altered to this fact by seeing 
something that looks like nuts on the dish and by her sister pointing out that Mongolian 
dishes are often served with Mongolian Pine Nuts. Hannah still eats the nuts anyways due to 
the fact that the menu does not state nuts are served with her dish.  
IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT is introduced by Phelan (2014) and features the 
protagonist Kate asking a stranger whether she is on Main Street. She relies primarily on the 
testimony from the stranger—a point made explicit in the study—to direct her to the right 
street, in cases that are unimportant and life-threatening. Kate’s evidence suggests that she 
has heard the stranger correctly, and she could gather more information via non-testimonial 
sources, but she does not: indeed, she acts merely upon the strangers’ testimonies.  
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The experimental literature offers tepid support for invariantist reductionism 
beginning with the Feltz and Zarpentine (2010) study of BRIDGE. This study features a 
typical reductionist vignette in which it is made explicit that the protagonist “reasons upon” 
[Feltz and Zarpentine (2010), p. 206] the testimony provided by the radioperson and based 
on both the testimony and his inferential process concludes that he’s safe in driving over the 
bridge. If invariantist reductionism is correct, one should see a positive mean attribution of 
knowledge by participants in both low and high cases of BRIDGE –means were 3.83 and 3.4, 
respectively, which is a small pro-attitude by participants in favor of knowledge [p. 699]. 
Only a small, statistically-insignificant number of participants did not predicate knowledge in 
low- and high-stakes, 27% and 35%, respectively, even when John must drive over a 
thousand foot bridge [p. 694]. BRIDGE was only a single study, run one with one hundred and 
forty students, and it provides limited support for the invariantist reductionist. Sadly 
enough, we shall anticipate that the evidence provided by the results of the other studies 
largely preempts the findings of BRIDGE. 
IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT are cases that specifically represent Kate the wandering 
walker exclusively relying on testimony, while she could rely on her vision, for example, to 
gather further evidence. Three elements allow us to claim that Phelan has inadvertently 
proposed a non-reductionist setting for this vignette. First, the studies note that Kate has no 
defeaters (no “special reason” to think her testifiers are mistaken). Second, Phelan is explicit 
that she has the possibility to search for further non-testimonial evidence, such as finding a 
map, but that she does not do so. Finally, he mentions that the reason why Kate does not 
need extra-evidence is because she forms the belief that she is on Main Street simply “on the 
basis of what the passerby tells her” [(2013), p. 7]. Across two studies participants were 
asked: “How confident should Kate be that she is on Main Street?” when she has received 
testimony from a general passerby (in the first study) and a tipsy but otherwise trustworthy 
drunk (in the second study).  
Despite the question concerning confidence in evidence rather than knowledge 
attribution, the non-reductionist setting of this study allows us to draw significant 
conclusions for invariantist accounts of testimonial knowledge. As stated by Phelan’s Bridge 
from Rational Confidence to Evidence (BRCE), “peoples’ implicit commitments about an 
agent’s evidence set or quality of evidence are reflected in their explicit intuitive judgments 
about how confident that agent ought to be in various propositions supported by that 
evidence” [p.5]. Asking about rational confidence in evidence when the only evidentiary 
source on which the protagonist relies is testimony from a passerby – and when she has no 
defeaters for that testimony – is a way of asking whether testimonial evidence alone is 
sufficient to convey knowledge in the given situation. In other words, it is a way of 
investigating the central claim of non-reductionism. The studies participants’ confidence 
between high and low stakes cases was statistically insignificant in non-juxtaposed cases, 
going from 5.32 (low)-4.5 (high) in the first study and from 4.29-4.09 in the second study 
(scale is 1-7, from 1 ‘not confident’ to 7 ‘very confident.’) This evidence of significant 
confidence predication on the sole basis of testimony suggests that invariantist reductionism 
is incorrect, because participants attribute confidence to Kate in the absence of non-
testimonial evidence.   
Suppose, for the sake argument, invariantist reductionists object that Phelan’s study 
fails because it does not measure whether participants are unconsciously making an inductive 
inference from the passerby’s testimony to the confidence she should have in what she hears. 
If this is the case, then participants are basing their confidence measurements on both their 
unconscious deliberations and the vignette. This argumentative line would undermine our 
claim that Phelan’s non-juxtaposed cases count against invariantist reductionism. However, 
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one of Phelan’s more interesting results was finding that juxtaposed cases resulted in a 
statistically-significant stakes effect, with the effect of importance in juxtaposed cases being 
more than 5 to 2.5 times (from study one to study two) greater than effect sizes when cases 
were not juxtaposed. Phelan believes that juxtaposing the cases should not make a difference. 
Likewise, invariantist reductionism and non-reductionism would consider both cases to 
require the same, non-stakes-sensitive account of knowledge predication: therefore, they 
would presumably predict that there should be no changes by listing two stakes cases instead 
of one. Instead, this seems to be the kind of evidence most appropriate to allow participants 
to see what is significant in each case; or, at least participants can now consider both cases 
and make a decision on their own, for they are in a superior epistemic position to evaluate 
the cases, as argued by Hansen (2014).  We agree with Hansen that the best explanation of 
juxtaposition is a stakes effect whose significance has been confirmed by Hansen: 
participants’ best, most rational responses come when they can compare similar cases and 
consider the significant differences between the vignettes. Phelan’s finding a stakes effect in 
juxtaposed cases constitutes strong evidence against both traditional views on testimony, 
which are insensitive to the burden of practical interests on the attribution of testimonial 
knowledge. With evidence of a stakes effect and significant confidence in testimonial 
evidence, IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT disconfirms invariantist reductionism and non-
reductionism.  
In contrast, it should be evident that non-invariantist views can account for Phelan’s 
findings. Non-invariantist non-reductionism is not committed to grant knowledge to Kate in 
high-stakes, as the fact that her life depends on her being on Main Street by noon provides 
her with a practical defeater for the random passerby’s testimony. Non-invariantist 
reductionism can explain why Kate does not acquire knowledge from testimony in high-
stakes by pointing out that her urgent practical needs require that her threshold for evidence 
in the situation be increased, so that she needs to acquire further non-testimonial evidence to 
back up the passerby’s words.  
These findings disconfirm the weak argument in support of invariantist reductionism 
provided by BRIDGE and align with the analysis of the last study under consideration. In 
PINE NUTS, Hannah, the protagonist of whom the knowledge predication is made, has 
testimonial evidence from the menu that her dish does not contain pine nuts and she forms 
that belief “based on this” testimonial evidence [Sripada and Stanley (2012), p. 12]. However, 
she also appears to have counter-evidence for that testimony – namely, her visual seeming 
that there may be nuts on the noodles and her sister’s testimony that the dish may be 
topped with pine nuts. Sripada and Stanley did three tests on various versions of PINE NUTS, 
testing versions of the basic vignette, making the stakes implicit or explicit, and making 
Hannah and her sister unaware of Hannah’s allergy (which vitiates that vignette as a study 
of testimony—see the next paragraph for argument). Sripada and Stanley found that there 
was a stakes effect for the strength of evidence in all three versions as well as a stakes effect 
for knowledge attribution in all except the basic vignette. Again, this is significant because 
both invariantist forms of reductionism and non-reductionism would not predict the stakes 
effect in knowledge attribution. Notice too that the stakes effect for strength of evidence is 
significant, for it is a consideration of how much trust Hannah can put in the testimonial 
evidence provided by the menu and by her sister’s testimony as well as in the non-
testimonial evidence provided by her visual seeming.   
In order to determine whether or not this case succeeds in providing evidence against 
invariantist views, it is necessary to address two responses available to invariantists. First, 
they might point out that PINE NUTS merely provides evidence for a salience effect, not for a 
stakes effect. Buckwalter and Schaffer (2013) re-ran Stanley and Sripada’s PINE NUTS cases 
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with additional information in each vignette to emphasize the salience of stakes effects 
through details such as the kind of health problems Hannah will experience in low versus 
high and the genetic factors underlying various allergic reactions to pine nuts. Buckwalter 
and Schaffer find that salience, not stakes, is causing the difference in knowledge and 
evidence predication. These results can be questioned due to the amount and specificity of 
the salience details featured in the story. In both vignettes, at least half of the story features 
descriptions of the pine nuts allergies: thus, it would be hard not to find a salience effect 
when narrator cues dominate the communication of a vignette. A third study to confirm the 
salience effect, which is generated by the narrator describing how horrible it would be to 
have a pine nut allergy without the menu noting the use of pine nuts, reveals a non-
testimony related salience effect. But this study utilized an adjusted version of PINE NUTS 
adapted from Sripada and Stanley that states Hannah and her sister cannot have knowledge 
of Hannah’s pine nut allergies. Such an alteration eliminates the significance of testimonial 
and non-testimonial evidence in this study. If these women cannot know about Hannah’s 
allergy, then there is no reason for them to care about trusting the menu nor should their 
visual evidence function as a defeater. Without a fourth study comparing the salience effect 
that is significant but not overplayed and overwhelming of stakes, it is difficult to see how 
Buckwalter and Schaffer’s work helps the invariantist.  
A second response open to invariantists would be to resist Sripada and Stanley’s 
findings by denying that Hannah has knowledge in low-stakes. The rationale behind this 
strategy is that, once we admit that knowledge is to be predicated in low-stakes, invariantists 
are committed to grant knowledge in high-stakes, since the only difference between the two 
scenarios concerns non-epistemic factors. Therefore, in order to deny that Hannah has 
knowledge in low-stakes, both invariantist reductionist and non-reductionist have to question 
the nature of the evidence at her disposal. Invariantist non-reductionists should argue that 
she lacks knowledge due to the presence of visual and testimonial defeaters. Invariantist 
reductionists should point out that she fails to acquire knowledge because she lacks adequate 
non-testimonial evidence in support of the testimony provided by the menu, while she has 
significant evidence against it. 
Both invariantist strategies are problematic for two reasons. First, these attempts 
clash with findings by Sripada and Stanley, which offers strong support for the claim that 
Hannah acquires knowledge from testimony in low-stakes (knowledge predications are above 
midline in two of the three studies, and just under midline in the third), as well as a stakes 
effect for knowledge and evidence. In light of these results, the invariantist’s move looks like 
a stubborn attempt to bite the bullet. In contrast, they should provide stronger argument for 
why we ought to disregard Sripada and Stanley’s results. Second, Sripada and Stanley’s 
findings suggest that we ought to consider Hannah’s visual seeming and her sister’s 
testimony merely as potential undefeated defeaters: Undefeated defeaters because Hannah 
does not search for further evidence to confirm or disconfirm what the menu says about her 
dish; Potential defeaters because, interestingly enough for the purposes of this paper, their 
capacity to undermine the testimony of the menu is conditional upon Hannah’s practical 
interests. In other words, it seems the consequences of Hannah’s eating pine nuts in low-
stakes are so harmless that she can disregard the potential defeaters – by thinking, for 
instance, that what looks like pine nuts may in fact be little pieces of garlic. On the contrary, 
the fact that in high-stakes eating pine nuts will cause her to die makes it irrational for her 
to overlook the defeaters. Thus, this case illustrates another interesting way in which 
practical interests can affect knowledge attributions, i.e. by activating or disabling potential 
epistemic defeaters depending on what’s at stake for the epistemic subject in a given 
situation. But the fact that these defeaters do not activate in low-stakes undermines the 
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invariantist’s strategy: specifically, it undermines non-reductionists’ response because Hannah 
lacks defeaters. It also undermines reductionists’ response because – absent this counter-
evidence – Hannah’s belief that her dish does not contain pine nuts might simply ground in 
an inductive inference from the testimony of the menu to the probability of finding pine nuts 
in the plate. Therefore, invariantists fail to provide conclusive reasons to overcome the 
results of the study and to contend that Hannah lacks knowledge in low-stakes.11  
Non-invariantist theories of testimonial knowledge can avoid this unwelcome 
conclusion by offering a different account of Hannah’s evidence against the information 
provided by the menu. Non-invariantist non-reductionists can contend that the potential 
undefeated defeaters get activated in high-stakes by Hannah’s risk to die if she eats pine 
nuts. On a non-invariantist non-reductionist view, the presence of undefeated defeaters 
undermines Hannah’s knowledge in high-stakes. Along similar lines, non-invariantist 
reductionists can argue that, since her life is at stake, it is rational that she takes her visual 
experience and her sister’s testimony into serious consideration and that she weighs such 
counter-evidence against the testimonial evidence provided by the menu. It is evident that 
the balance of reasons demands that she looks for further non-testimonial evidence, e.g. that 
she double-checks with the chefs that they did not put any pine nuts on her dish. 
In an overview of the experimental philosophy stakes literature, empirical studies 
support our argument: both IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT and PINE NUTS undermines 
invariantism by evincing that these positions cannot account for stakes effects. Furthermore, 
IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT provides support beyond concerns with stakes effects. As 
mentioned, the study provides additional evidence against invariantist reductionism, because 
this view cannot account for significant knowledge predications in low stakes cases of non-
reductionist vignettes.  Another aspect of the study evinces that our account is correct: when 
Phelan asked participants to check all of the factors that should impact Kate’s confidence 
that she is on Main Street after being so testified, he found that forty-three percent of 
individuals chose the stakes-sensitive feature. This response presents a significant number of 
participants who find practical interests as having import for evidence, especially when most 
of the choices on the list of factors are defeaters (i.e. the quality of Kate’s hearing, her 
understanding of English, the emotional state of herself and the testifier, the reliability of 
past testifiers). The most linear interpretation of such a case is that the folk are sensitive to 
stakes exactly as argued in Section 1, according to which practical interests can affect 
predications of testimonial knowledge to the extent that, when in high stakes, the hearer 
might not be in a position to accept the very same testimony that she accepted in low stakes.  
 
Section 3: Conclusion and Further Work 
 
This paper has considered a topic of interest to traditional epistemology, stakes effects on 
attributions of testimonial knowledge, through combining conceptual analysis with evidence 
coming from experimental studies. Our work has shown that the stakes effect on testimony 
can be disentangled by a cooperative interaction between traditional and experimental 
philosophy.  
In Section 1, we offered a conceptual argument showing that both invariantist 
reductionism and non-reductionism are committed to analyze high-stakes scenarios in the 
same way they conceive low-stake scenarios – i.e. to grant (or, to deny) H the epistemic right 
to trust S that he possesses (or, lacks) in low-stakes – in that both are insensitive to variance 
of practical interests. On the contrary, the non-invariantist accounts we introduced explain 
why in high-stakes H may lose the epistemic entitlement to believe S’s testimony due to 
practical defeaters or to the increase in the threshold of evidence for acquiring testimonial 
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knowledge. As presented in Section 2, the experimental literature, despite its design and ends 
towards defending various positions in the general stakes debate, provides cases, such as 
IMPORTANT-UNIMPORTANT and PINE NUTS, that undermine invariantist non-reductionism 
and reductionism, while being perfectly compatible with the proposed non-invariantist 
accounts.  
In an attempt to commence discussion of stakes for testimony in the traditional and 
experimental literature, our paper has had to complete a number of tasks: reviewing ways 
testimony has already appeared in the stakes effect literature, presenting a novel response to 
stakes effects on testimony, and considering the successes of various studies to test testimony 
through particular vignettes. There are many subjects that could be tested, including 
philosophical definitions of testimony and the assumption, common to the testimony 
literature, that testimony and epistemic states can be transmitted from speakers to hearers. 
To test these issues would be fairly easy: like many of her colleagues Jennifer Lackey 
provides vivid thought experiments, i.e. the Creationist biology teacher [Lackey (2008), p. 
48], that could easily be turned into vignettes to test intuitions concerning these issues. The 
same goes for basic intuitions behind reductionism and non-reductionism, as well as positions 
that do not fit easily into the reductionist-non-reductionist dichotomy. Returning to one of 
the great movements in traditional conceptual analysis, there are many Gettier cases that 
feature testimony, stretching from Gettier’s coins case to Harman’s assassination case. The 
possibility of testing testimony is nearly boundless. Our paper is a clarion to commence a 
study long delayed.12 
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Notes 
 
1 We discuss Freedman (2015a), Kukla (2015), Freedman (2015b), and Fantl (2015), all of whom take 
up the question of stakes effects for testimony, at the end of section 1.2. Freedman’s 2015 paper began 
this dialogue on testimony and practical interests. The spirit of Freedman’s project is – broadly 
speaking – similar to ours, yet our paper distinguishes itself from Freedman’s in two main respects. 
First, Freedman puts forth a pragmatist account of testimonial justification meant to undermine both 
standard accounts of testimony, whereas we suggest that both reductionism and non-reductionism can 
accommodate the pragmatist worries by adopting a non-invariantist framework. Thus, while it might 
look like Freedman has a more positive project to offer, she is too quick in dismissing the traditional 
accounts of testimonial knowledge and we aim to show that we can salvage them. Second, we 
thoroughly review the experimental philosophy literature and find data that supports our position.  
2 See Cohen (1999) and DeRose (2009). 
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3 See Stanley (2005), Hawthorne (2004), and Fantl and McGrath (2007). 
4 See Knobe and Schaffer (2012).  
5 See section 1.2 for further considerations of epistemic entitlement. 
6 Notice, for instance, that the entry on testimony in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes 
only a reference to the general stakes literature (Adler 2015), whereas the entry in the Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy relegates the discussion of non-invariantist accounts of testimony to a short 
sub-section (Green 2008). 
7 For further clarifications about the distinction between trustworthiness and reliability, as well as 
between trust and reliance, see McMyler (2011). 
8 It seems plausible to the authors of this paper that when H has ordinary practical interests, he can 
acquire knowledge directly from S’s words unless his background beliefs contrast with her testimony or 
he has clues of her untrustworthiness. The straightforward moral we could draw from these “non-
reductionism friendly” considerations is that reductionists pose a too strict condition for the 
transmission of testimonial knowledge in low-stake cases like FAR LOW, for H appears to have the 
epistemic right to trust S before making any inductive inference from S’s alleged trustworthiness to the 
acceptability of her testimony. However, our goal here is not that of contrasting the non-reductionist 
rendering of our example with the reductionist one. Rather, we aim to reformulate both the traditional 
accounts in such a way that each of them is in the position to account for the intuition that H’s 
practical interests affect his standards for acquiring knowledge from S’s testimony. For these reasons, in 
the remainder of this paper we set these considerations and our worries aside. 
9 It is worth mentioning that also Bank cases feature testimony, since the driver has her friend’s words, 
in addition to evidence that ranges from previous experiences at the bank to seeing a large line 
stretching outside the bank.  In these cases testimony features as evidence for the driver, although the 
occurrence of testimony is extremely complex and, ultimately, unhelpful to assay invariantist views. 
10 Pine Nuts first featured in Sripada and Stanley (2012), and retested in Buckwalter and Schaffer 
(2013).  
11 A referee proposed the following intriguing response. One might disagree with the idea that 
Hannah's visual seeming and her sister's testimony should constitute potential undefeated defeaters, 
and offer an alternative diagnosis of this case, according to which the counter-evidence provided by the 
defeaters is directly proportional to the testimonial evidence provided by the menu. On the one hand, if 
Hannah acquires strong testimonial evidence from the menu in low-stakes, there's no reason why her 
seeming and her sister's testimony should not provide significant counter-evidence against the menu. 
On the other, if the menu provides weak evidence in high stakes, so needs to be the evidence provided 
by Hannah's seeming and her sister's testimony. This alternative response is an interesting non-
invariantist picture, which deserves further analysis. However, this view entails an account of pragmatic 
encroachment on evidence that we are not endorsing here. On the contrary, it seems more plausible to 
contend that stakes affect thresholds for knowledge, to the extent that the evidence Hannah acquires 
from the menu grants–or, fails to grant—her knowledge depending on what's at stake for her in the 
vignette. Denying pragmatic encroachment on evidence does not undermine Stanley and Sripada's 
results on the stakes effect for strength of evidence, because differences in folk attributions of evidence 
to Hannah can be explained by the activation of potential undefeated defeaters, as our argument 
suggests. 
12 The authors would like to thank Fernando Broncano Berrocal and two anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
